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Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is a difficult-to-treat infection that only in
the European Union affects about 150,000 patients and causes extra costs of 380 million Euros
annually to the health-care systems. Increasing efforts have been taken to mitigate the epidemics
and to avoid potential outbreaks in low endemic settings. Understanding the population dynamics
of MRSA through modeling is essential to identify the causal mechanisms driving the epidemics
and to generalize conclusions to different contexts. We develop an innovative high-resolution
spatiotemporal contact network model of interactions between patients to reproduce the hospital
population in the context of the Stockholm County in Sweden and simulate the spread of MRSA
within this population. Our model captures the spatial and temporal heterogeneities caused by
human behavior and by the dynamics of mobility within wards and hospitals. We estimate that in
this population the epidemic threshold is at about 0.008. We also identify that these heterogeneous
contact patterns cause the emergence of super-spreader patients and a polynomial growth of the
epidemic curve. We finaly study the effect of standard intervention control strategies and identify
that screening is more effective than improved hygienics in order to cause smaller or null outbreaks.
The increasing tolerance of some bacteria to currently
available antibiotics has become a major public health issue
in recent decades1,2. Hospital-acquired (HA) Methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) infection has been
routinely detected in hospitalized patients including those
in high-income countries. In the European Union 150,000
patients are affected annually3. In Sweden, for instance,
the incidence rate (per 100,000 people) of MRSA jumped
from 10.76 in 2005 to 29.96 in 20144. Although some strains
may be harmless to healthy people or are not health-care
associated, such difficult-to-treat infections are particularly
dangerous in a context of individuals with weakened immune
systems5,6. Bacteria resistance may develop spontaneously,
but commonly, a healthy person become infected via direct
contact with an infected host, or contaminated devices and
surfaces7. A hospital setting, if not under strict hygienic
control, provides excellent conditions for efficient spread of
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MRSA. Although colonization typically occurs in the ante-
rior nares, open wounds, urinary infections, or intravenous
catheters are also potential sites for infection. Therefore,
the daily contact between health care workers (HCW) and
patients is sufficient for the propagation of the pathogens.
This is worsened because colonized individuals, even if not
ill, may still infect others. During a regular shift, HCWs
typically interact with various patients whereas patients usu-
ally interact with different HCWs. These interactions create
dynamic contact networks8,9 in which the MRSA infection
eventually propagates. These contact networks have a com-
plex structure of who was in contact with whom at a given
time because of the non-trivial dynamics of a typical day in
a hospital10. Although the transmission between a patient
and a HCW may be more likely in certain wards (e.g. burns
or transplant unit7), the mobility of patients between wards
or hospitals creates the missing links responsible to sustain
the spread of HA-MRSA. Therefore, identifying which con-
tact patterns (or network structures11) regulate the propa-
gation of the infection is the first step to better understand
the spread potential of MRSA, and then to develop efficient
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2protocols to reduce the incidence in endemic areas and to
avoid potential outbreaks in low-prevalence contexts12.
Mechanistic models aim to generate an abstract mathe-
matical representation of the most relevant characteristics
of a system. The gain in understanding, particularly of the
causal relations, by simplifying the problem compensates the
information that is discarded. This approach, successfully
used in other disciplines to e.g. forecast the weather or the
movement of planets, fundamentally differs from traditional
epidemiological methods such as controlled experiments and
logistic regression models. A mechanistic model allows as-
sessing realistic scenarios without the need to experiment
on the real population. These models in fact have been
used for a long time to study the spread of infections at the
population level13,14. In the context of MRSA, a number
of studies have been published in recent years mostly us-
ing the frameworks of compartmental and agent-based mod-
els15. Compartmental models are convenient because they
can be elegantly described by a set of coupled differential
equations, used to describe a group of well-mixed individ-
uals in a certain state16,17, and can be sometimes studied
analytically17,18. Agent-based models, on the other hand,
request more computational resources but are more flexi-
ble and allow the addition of different levels of complexity
by defining updating and interaction rules for each individ-
ual19,20. Previous models typically focus either on the popu-
lation dynamics within a single ward21 or in a single hospital
with a few wards17,22, between one hospital and the com-
munity22, or between multiple hospitals with a simple ward
structure17,20. As in any modeling exercise, these studies
make a series of assumptions regarding different aspects of
the population. In particular, exponential probability dis-
tributions are defined to account for the patients length-of-
stay, readmission, or referral to another hospital16–18. Even
in models with some structure, i.e. those that have more
than one ward or one hospital, average values are used to
characterize similar units, as for example, the size of the
hospital or the frequency of interactions between HCWs and
patients in each ward17,20. In other words, these previous
models attempted to reproduce the hospital population but
failed to fully capture the heterogeneities and complexity
of the contact patterns and patient mobility, emerging as a
consequence of referral and readmission of patients within
and between hospitals.
In this paper, we propose a network-based model of the
full hospitalized patients of the Stockholm county in Swe-
den, a population of about 2,192,433 inhabitants. By us-
ing information of patient flow (inpatients), we are able to
reconstruct, at the individual level, the potential contacts
between all patients in all hospitals and care units of the
county. These contacts, mediated by HCW or contamined
objects and surfaces, are the most likely pathways for the
spread of HA-MRSA. We assume that a contact exists be-
tween two patients if they have been hospitalized in the same
ward at the same time. This methodology naturally captures
realistic contact patterns and avoids several assumptions re-
garding the dynamics of patients as for example, length-of-
stay, readmitance, mobility between wards and hospitals,
hospital size, etc. Using realistic information is particularly
important since people are different and contact patterns
cannot be characterized by the average behavior. We show
that the realistic contact patterns observed in this dataset
are responsible for the appearence of few highly contagious
individuals and for the polynomial growth of the prevalence
curve in the absence of community infected individuals. Fur-
thermore, we observe that the probability distribution of the
final outbreak is quite heterogeneous with high likelihood of
small or large outbreaks. We also study the effect of screen-
ing upon hospital admission and improved hygienics on the
outbreak size after one year of the onset of the epidemics.
Model
Patient Flow Data Set. We gather information on the
admission and discharge dates of 743,182 patients in 485
hospitals and nursing homes at 52 different geographical lo-
cations in the Stockholm County, Sweden. This information
is collect during 3,059 continuous days in the 2000s (the ex-
act years are confidential for ethical reasons). A total of
2,019,236 admissions are recorded. Each patient and the
respective ward of hospitalization are anonymous but both
have unique IDs for identification.
Contact Network Model. A contact network is a set of
links connecting pairs of vertices8,9. Our contact network
model is formed by patients (the vertices) that shared a
ward at the same time (Fig. 1A). We assume that patient-to-
patient contacts occurs through hidden HCWs or contami-
nated objects and surfaces. We discard contacts made in the
community (non-hospitalized population). The time resolu-
tion is one day, implying that the contact network changes
in time, i.e. a link (representing the contact) between two
individuals may exist or not at a given time8,9. After each
day, links may appear, disappear or be maintained according
to real-life patient’s dynamics.
Contagion Model. We assume that a patient may be ei-
ther Uninfected (U), Contagious (C), or Infected (I)23. Tran-
sitions between these states occur according to the interac-
tion dynamics or according to the progression of the infec-
tion (Fig. 1B). An uninfected patient can be infected upon
contact, with probability βC and βI, from a patient that
is C or I, respectively. An individual in the states C or I
cannot be re-infected. Upon infection, i.e. when turning to
state C, the person will develop the infection with probabil-
ity µ = 0.223 or naturally recover with 1 − µ. If the per-
son develops the infection, it moves from state C to I after
τinfec = 9.5 days
22,23. On the other hand, if the person natu-
rally recovers, it moves from state C to U after an average of
τrec = 370 days
16. We assume that an admitted patient may
be contagious with probability αadm
21 and consequently un-
infected with 1 − αadm. If treatment occurs, the patient is
cured after τtreat and then can be reinfected. Table 1 sum-
marizes the parameters of the model. Discharged patients
are assumed to be uninfected. We also assume antibiotic
resistance does not emerge spontaneously in this population
during the study period.
Results
Patient Dynamics
The hospital system contains 859 clinics and 979 wards
distributed within 485 hospitals. There is an assymetry in
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Figure 1: Architecture of the population and the MRSA contagion model. (a) shows the structure of the contact network within the various levels of
the hospital system and (b) shows the potential transitions between states in the MRSA infectious disease model.
Parameter Value
Per-contact Infection probability if C βC
Per-contact Infection probability if I βI
Probability to develop infection µ = 0.2
Prob. admitted infected αadm
Time at stage C if developing infec. τinfec = 9.5 days
Time at stage C if not developing infec. τrec = 370 days
Time to cure if treated τtreat = 7 days
Table 1: Parameters of the model. The table shows the parameters and
respective values, if fixed, of the model.
which the majority of the hospitals and health care units
contain a single clinic and a single ward whereas a few
rarer hospitals and health care units contain more than 10
clinics and wards (Fig. 2A,B). Although this observation
may be expected from real-life experience, this diversity of
hospital structure has important consequences on modeling
since it shows that hospitals are different in terms of inter-
nal structure and thus uniform or homogenous assumptions
inneficiently represent the hospital system. The dynamics
of hospitalizations also follows non-trivial patterns. There
are strong weekly and annual patterns in which the hospital
population may decrease about 25% (Fig. 2C) during sum-
mer and winter breaks, and about 10% (Fig. 2D) over the
weekend in comparison to week-days.
The duration of hospitalizations (Tin) and times between
subsequent hospitalizations (Tout) also follow non-trivial
patterns. Figure 2E,F shows that the distribution of both
measures strongly differ from the typical homogeneous (ex-
ponential) assumption. In fact, the vast majority of patients
spend a few days in the hospital whereas a substantially re-
duced number of patients may spend over a year in there24.
Long stays both increase the risk of infection and of fur-
ther spread in case the respective patient becomes infected.
Similarly, the interval between two hospitalizations shows
that most patients are readmitted within few weeks after
discharge whereas few of them return to the hospital more
than a year after being discharged. In other words, these
results mean that hospitalizations tend to be short but fre-
quent, a dynamics that may contribute to community in-
fection if discharged patients go home contagious and make
frequent contacts with other individuals. We also observe
that the probability to return to the hospital (re-admission)
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Figure 2: Spatial and temporal patterns. Fraction of hospitals with a
given number of (A) clinics (Ch) or (B) wards (Wh), both axes are in
log-scale; Typical (C) annual and (D) weekly cycles; Distribution (E) of
the duration of hospital stays and (F) of the times between two subse-
quent hospitalizations by the same patient. Both axes are in log-scale.
decreases with the time between hospitalizations (see supple-
mentary Figure ??A). Similarly, the average hospitalization
times decrease with the time between two hospitalizations
(see supplementary Figure ??B). These temporal correla-
tions are typically discarded when modeling the population
dynamics of MRSA. The consequence of this heterogeneity
is that individuals are not the same and thus have different
relevance in the spread of an infection.
4Infection Dynamics
To study the population dynamics of simulated HA-
MRSA in the Swedish context, we select one year of the orig-
inal data set and extract the contact patterns between the
patients. This sample has 170,839 patients and 20,483,587
contacts. For simplicity, we assume that βC = βI = β and
scan the values of the per-contact infection probability β to
estimate the reproduction number R0 through simulations.
We also assume αadm = 0 and no treatment. R0 defines a
threshold in which a large epidemic outbreak may occur if
R0 > 1 or may not occur if R0 < 1. To estimate R0, we
first infect a single individual at time 0 (zero) and set all
other individuals as uninfected, then we simulate the spread
of the infection following the infection dynamics (see section
”Contagion Model”) and count the number of secondary in-
fections made by the seed infected individual. We repeat this
procedure 20000 times to calculate the statistics. Figure 3
shows that the epidemic threshold is at β ∼ 0.008, there-
fore implying that if the infection probability is larger than
β ∼ 0.008, a large epidemic outbreak is likely to happen in
a fully uninfected population.
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Figure 3: Reproduction number. The relation between the infection
probability β and the reproduction number (secondary infections) ac-
cording to simulations of the spread of the infection. The dashed line at
R0 = 1 represents the epidemic threshold. The x-axis is in log-scale.
The heterogeneity of the network structure implies that
patients do not have the same role. Looking at the distri-
bution of R0, i.e. the number of secondary infections when
we start the infection at random patients, we observe that,
for both low and high per-contact infection probability, most
nodes cause zero or few secondary infections whereas a very
few particular patients may cause up to 40 secondary infec-
tions (Fig. 4A,B), which may characterize them as super-
spreaders. This is a consequence of making too many con-
tacts, possibly because they spend a much larger than aver-
age time in the hospital.
We investigate the growth curve of the epidemic out-
break for two values of the per-contact infection probabil-
ity, β = 0.0106 (low) and β = 0.0303 (high). Figure 4C,D
shows the average number of infectious (red curve) and con-
tagious (yellow curve) individuals in time for both infection
probabilities. It takes around 100 days for the number of in-
fectious individuals to take off, yet, in both cases, the curves
are characterized by a (trend) polynomial linear growth after
the initial non-linear regime (Fig. 4C,D). The effect of the
lower number of patients during holidays appears at around
200 days after the onset of the epidemics (the location of this
decrease depends on the starting dates of the simulation),
however, the decrease in the number of contagious and in-
fectious individuals is not as significant as the decrease on
the total number of patients. It is also possible to see that
the weekly pattern reflects on the number of contagious in-
dividuals and to a lesser extent on the number of infectious
individuals. The distribution of outbreak sizes Ωi (conta-
gious plus infectious individuals) also has a particular bi-
modal shape. It indicates that a large number of outbreaks
will cause less than 100 infections but on the other hand
there is a non-negligible chance of large outbreaks affecting
more than 1000 individuals.
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Figure 4: Evolution of the state of the patients. The reproduction
number for (A) low (β = 0.0106) and (B) high (β = 0.0303) per-contact
infection probability. y-axes are in log-scale. The evolution of the num-
ber of contagious and infectious individuals for (C) low (β = 0.0106)
and (D) high (β = 0.0303) per-contact infection probabilities. The fi-
nal outbreak size (at T = 365 days) for (E) low (β = 0.0106) and (F)
high (β = 0.0303) per-contact infection probabilities. Both axes are in
log-scale.
Infection control
We study the effect of screening and hygienics in the in-
fection dynamics. To do so, we assume that newly admit-
ted patients may be contagious with a probability αadm =
0.087721, implying on a constant influx of contagious pa-
tients that is different from the assumptions of the previous
section. Furthermore, we assume that screened and infec-
tious patients automatically undergo treatment, lasting on
average τtreat = 7 days. During treatment, patients are quar-
antined and cannot infect or be re-infected.
The constant influx of multiple contagious patients im-
5plies that a lower per-contact infection probability is able
to sustain the epidemics. We thus test two scenarios, with
β = 0.002 (low) and β = 0.004 (high), i.e. bellow the epi-
demic threshold. To simulate screening, we select a random
fraction ψ of admitted patients and put them into treatment
if contagious; uninfected patients are released. Figure 5A
shows that for both infection probabilities, increasing the
fraction of screened patients decreases the final outbreak size
Ω (we estimate Ω by taking the average number of conta-
gious and infectious patients in the last week of the data, i.e.
T = [359, 365]). However, irrespective of β, full screening is
necessary to reduce Ω to zero. To simulate increased hygien-
ics, for example by properly washing hands before touching
patients, we decrease the per-contact infection probability
by a factor 1 − φ, that is, we set the per-contact infection
probability as β ∗ (1− φ). Figure 5B shows that improving
by 50% the hygienics is insufficient to reduce by half the out-
break size (measured in the same way as for the screening).
Relatively speaking, screening turns out to be more effective
than improving hygienics in this population.
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Figure 5: Screening and improved hygienics. (A) the outbreak size
vs. increased hygienics for low (β = 0.002) and high (β = 0.004)
per-contact infection probability; (B) the outbreak size vs. screening
on admitance for (a) low (β = 0.002) and high (β = 0.004) per-
contact infection probabilities. In both cases, the final outbreak size
Ω is calculated as the average outbreak on the last week of the data, i.e.
T = [359, 365].
Discussion
Antibiotic-resistant bacteria has been increasingly pressing
hospital systems in both low and high-income countries.
In particular, Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
(MRSA) is a difficult to treat bacteria that can be par-
ticularly dangerous to people with weakened immune sys-
tem such as hospitalized individuals. Although antibiotic-
resistance has developed due to intense use of antibiotics,
MRSA commonly spreads through physical contacts with
infected individuals, objects or surfaces. In order to under-
stand this dynamics of infections, we develop a data-driven
model of contact patterns between patients in a large hospi-
tal system in Sweden. Such model is able to capture spatial
and temporal heterogeneities, inherent to hospital structures
and patients behavior, into the network structure.
We simulate the spread of MRSA in a fully uninfected
population and estimate that the epidemic threshold (R0 =
1) is relatively high, that is, it occurs at β ∼ 0.008. Nev-
ertheless, this threshold is lower in case of a constant in-
flux of contagious individuals, as typically occur in real sys-
tems. We observe that right above the threshold, the epi-
demic curve grows linearly (after an initial shorter non-linear
growth) as a consequence of the heterogeneities in the con-
tact patterns that constrain the spread and avoid an ex-
ponential growth, typically observed in theoretical models.
These heterogeneous contact patterns also cause the appear-
ance of a few super-spreaders, that is, individuals infecting
a much larger than average number of patients. Another
consequence is the bimodal distribution of outbreak sizes in
which the probability of minor outbreaks (< 100 infected
individuals) is relatively high, but larger outbreaks (> 1000
individuals) are not uncommon. This is in accordance to
previous reports of MRSA outbreaks in Sweden during the
1990s12.
The goal of modeling exercises is to understand the main
mechanisms sustaining the spread of MRSA in order to re-
duce its incidence and hence mortality and costs. The anal-
ysis of the population dynamics of the infection is often done
by comparing the implementation of some infection control
protocol against the absence of any action. It is generally
believed that hand hygiene is an effective means to avoid
the propagation of MRSA2,7; the challenge however lies in
enforcing such routine in daily life. We show that reduc-
ing infection, as a consequence of improved hygienics, by
50% is not sufficient to half the final outbreak size. Since
sufficient cleaning of hands and utensils is many times not
achievable, other strategies involving screening followed by
isolation of colonized or infected people have to be intro-
duced. As we have shown, screening every admitted patient
is a priori ideal but as previously reported25, associated to
high financial costs. Screening of intensive care patients or
previously documented carriers, on the other hand, has been
suggested as cost-effective alternatives to global screening25.
Since hospitals are strongly connected through transfer of
patients, a surveillance system based on a few sentinel hos-
pitals, chosen according to their centrality in this referral
network, may be also an effective means for early detection,
and thus control, of MRSA outbreaks26. An agreement on
the best cost-effective policies however is still missing.
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